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Summary: The sustained growth of the Hispanic population of the United States –that is 
to say, people of Latin American origin– now makes it the country’s largest minority, 
prompting considerable debate as to the capacity of the United States to assimilate, as 
well as on the way this group itself has developed. 
 
 
 
We are now one of the largest Spanish-speaking nations in the world. We are an 
important source of Latin music, journalism, and culture. One need only look at Miami, 
San Antonio, Los Angeles, Chicago, or the west of New York, New Jersey, and close your 
eyes and listen. You could easily be in Santo Domingo or Santiago, or San Miguel de 
Allende. 
 
For years our nation has debated this change –some have praised it, and some are 
angered by it–. By nominating me, my party has elected to welcome Latin America.’ 
 
George W. Bush [Miami, presidential campaign, 2000 (2)] 
 
 
The words of the then presidential candidate –beyond his electioneering– paint a picture 
of a growing reality for Americans. The streets of the most populous neighbourhoods of 
New York (Queens, Brooklyn, the Bronx, Upper Manhattan…) or nearby areas are alive 
with the accents of Latin America. The fact is that 2.4 million out of 9.3 million people who 
live in the metropolis –one in four (and half of all immigrants)– are of Hispanic origin. 
 
A similar process is underway in 35 of the 50 states of the Union (Suro and Singer, 2002). 
Latin Americans are now the largest ethnic minority, making up 35 million people (39 
million if one includes the country’s 3.8 million Puerto Ricans) –compared with 34.7 million 
African Americans–. That is 13% of the total population of the United States and, 
according to the Census Bureau, a figure that will rise to 70 million in 2020, reaching close 
to 100 million in 2050; a quarter of the total population. This means that in two decades, 
the United States will have the second largest Hispanic population in the world after 
Mexico, currently its main source of immigration. 
 
If, as the media insists, immigration is ‘changing the face of America’, then the information 
from the Census Bureau shows that Hispanics are leading the transformation. With a birth 
rate way above the national average –58% and 13% respectively between 1990 and 
2000– Hispanics are not only the largest minority but also the fastest growing. The 
government is all too aware of the social, economic, and political effects of this. 
 
The long-term effects of this are unclear. But among the questions it raises is the future of 
this group once it has established a stable presence. Or, to put it another way, will the 
assimilation machine be as efficient as with other migratory waves, with the concomitant 
loss of language and culture, or will we see the United States become a bi-lingual nation? 
The pressure to assimilate suggests not, and there are many sceptics who doubt the US 
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is turning bilingual; although there is concern among those who believe in the now-
somewhat devalued melting pot theory. 
 
It would seem that the answer to the question will only come from the second and 
subsequent generations. However, current developments suggest that the first hypothesis 
is the most likely. A number of studies have charted the decline in the use of the mother 
tongue among the children of immigrants. By the third generation, given their poor 
knowledge of the mother tongue and its lack of use at home in wider society (Veltman, 
1983), the loss is definitive. Nevertheless, even if the younger generation turns its back on 
Spanish, the presence of the language is stronger and stronger in everyday life. Ticket 
machines, ATMs, advertisements, warning signs, the media, large companies and public 
services are gradually incorporating it, thus normalizing the presence of the language. 
 
So we should not dismiss the second possibility out of hand. While pressure from the host 
environment means that the existing ways of doing things dominate, other cultural and 
historical factors will play a role, particularly the tradition of mestizaje, or miscegenation, 
which is a central tenet of life in Latin America. 
 
The following pages are an attempt to shed some light on these questions. In them we will 
combine secondary sources with observations based on our work in New York (3) to 
create an accurate picture in terms of the demography, economics and politics of the Latin 
American population in the United States, while bearing in mind cultural aspects to do with 
identity, language and belonging. This will allow us to put forward a hypothesis on its long-
term direction. 
 
The Demographic Factor 
 
In October 1965, at the height of the civil rights movement, a transcendental change took 
place in US immigration policy. Around this time, the so-called National Origins (4) laws 
were repealed after four decades, and a new system of visa allocation was introduced, 
based on family regrouping, professional skills and politics, all within an annual quota of 
20,000 immigrants. 
 
In 1970, the immigrant population was at its lowest ever –9.4 million people, or 5% of the 
total–. The change in the law brought about a major change in the origin of immigrants, 
opening the door to large numbers of people from Latin America and Asia. From that 
point, the number of immigrants has risen rapidly, so that by 2000, the Census showed 31 
million people, or 11.1% of the total population. Of that, 52% were from Latin America. In 
1990, they represented 44.3% of immigrants. Ten years before they were a third, and 
made up barely a fifth in 1970 (5). 
 
The structure of the foreign population has undergone a radical shift in this time. The 
number of Europeans fell from 75% in 1960, to 15% in 2000 and now makes up 4.4 
million against the previous 7.3 million. And although the Asian population has also risen 
sharply to 7.2 million, or a quarter of the total foreign population, the Latin American 
population has shot up. China, the biggest net source of immigrants in Asia, provides 1.4 
million, six times less than Mexico, the number one source, with eight million, and which 
contributes a quarter of the overseas population (27.6%), and more than half of all Latin 
Americans (66.1%). One has to go back to 1890, when 30% of immigrants came from 
Germany, to find such a high proportion from a single country. 
 
Between 1990 and 2000 alone there was an 82.4% increase in the number of Mexicans 
living in the United States. Along with them, Cuba, El Salvador and the Dominican 
Republic each contributed 952,000, 765,000 and 692,000 respectively by the beginning of 
the new millennium. Central America contributed almost ten million people, with 1.8 
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million coming from the Caribbean and a similar figure from South America (Schmidley & 
US Census Bureau, 2001). 
 
Almost a quarter of the overseas population lack permission to be in the United States: a 
key trend in current migration patterns, and which has increased in recent years. A study 
by the Institute of Migratory Policy estimated the figure in 2000 at some 8.5 million, 
although others have put it at 11 million. That would imply an annual average of half a 
million more people than the five million people calculated the previous decade (6). And 
again, Latin Americans make up three out of four. Mexicans alone make up 55% of the 
total number of illegal aliens. Asians make up 13%, with Europeans and Canadians 
contributing 6%, and the remainder coming from Africa and other areas (J. Passel, 2002). 
 
According to Súarez-Orozco (1999), three clear social trends can be seen behind this 
process of inter-American immigration. First, a more or less regular, but large-scale flow 
from Mexico that rises sharply after 1980; then periodic peaks from Central America and 
the South, linked to political conflict; and thirdly, those from Puerto Rico and the 
Dominican Republic, but who return home regularly. The effects of globalization and the 
restructuring of these countries’ economies, as well as US economic dependence on 
migratory labour, suggest that these flows will continue and that even if numbers 
eventually drop, Latin Americans will remain the dominant group. 
 
The 2000 Census recorded 35,305,818 Hispanics, 60% more than in 1990, when they 
made up 22.4 million of the US population, a 142% increase on the figure for 1980 (7). Of 
these, 22 million, or 62%, are of Mexican origin. In second place is Puerto Rico, with 
some 3.6 million, followed by Cuba with 1.3 million, El Salvador and the Dominican 
Republic each with around 1.1 million, and Colombia and Guatemala with between 
600,000 and 700,000. 
 
The remainder does not even reach the million mark (Suro, 2002). What stands out most 
in this regard is the composition, the result of the lower numbers in this decade (8). The 
‘new Latins’, as they are known, have doubled, growing from three million to around six 
million between 1990 and 2000. This has brought greater diversity to the Hispanic world, 
but made it more difficult to talk in general terms about it (Logan 2001; Suárez-Orozco, et 
al., 2002). 
 
At the same time, if the above-mentioned factors suggest migration is to be a long-term 
phenomenon, the high birth rate and the youthfulness of the population can only 
strengthen this tendency. Hispanic women have the highest birth rate: 95 out of every 
1,000 women of child-bearing age as opposed to 60 among the Anglo population in 2000. 
The rate among women aged between 40 and 44 –2.5 births on average– is enough to 
exceed the quota needed to replace deaths (Bachu and O’Connel, 2001). If we bear in 
mind that when the data was collected, 36% of Hispanics were aged under 18 –a figure 
that is ten points above the national average– and that the average age is ten years 
younger than the national average (25.9 and 35.3 respectively), we can see that both 
variables point to sustained growth. The number of Hispanics aged 65 and over is 
relatively low (5.3%), compared with the white non-Hispanic population (14%) (Therrien 
and Ramírez, 2001). 
 
An example of the importance of the first factor is to be found in California, one of the 
most populous states (34 million) in the Union, and which has the largest Hispanic 
population (11 million). Almost one in three people living there is now of Latin American 
origin (32%). At the same time, almost one in three Latin Americans in the United States 
lives there. Over the last decade, its population has increased by 4.1 million, but unlike 
other areas, the increase in this group is due to the high birth rate. According to official 
figures, for every 3.3 million new Hispanics, more than two were born in the state. Other 
Area: Latin America – WP Nº 22/2004 (Trans. Spanish) 
5/4/2004 
 
state statistics indicate that only 17% of population growth in the state is due to 
immigration. 
 
A high degree of concentration is one of the features of the Hispanic population that –as 
with all immigrants– tends to congregate in areas according to their origin. More than 
three quarters (27.1 million) live in the seven states that are home to a million or more 
people of Hispanic origin: California, Texas (6.7 million), New York (2.9 million), Florida 
(2.7 million), Illinois (1.5 million), Arizona (1.3 million) and New Jersey (1.1 million). In 
New Mexico, 42% of the population is Hispanic, the overwhelming majority being 
Mexican, the same as in California, Texas, Arizona, Illinois and Colorado. In Florida, the 
majority of Latin Americans are Cuban, while in New York and New Jersey, Puerto Ricans 
dominate. Outside the states mentioned, there are also significant concentrations in 
Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, North Carolina, Georgia, Iowa, Arkansas, Nebraska, 
Minnesota and other states that have not traditionally had large Hispanic populations. In 
some of them, for example, they make up to between 6% and 24.9% of the total 
population. 
 
This move into states that even ten years ago had a negligible Latin population is perhaps 
the most relevant aspect of the question, and is a clear sign that the population will 
increase further. As R. Suro and A. Singer (2002) have pointed out, while cities such as 
New York, Los Angeles, Miami and Chicago, which have long-established Latin 
communities, are those that have seen the biggest increase in absolute numbers, it is the 
new destinations and in particular medium-sized cities with a smaller original Latin 
population that have shown the biggest increases. 
 
Atlanta for example, where in 1980 the Latin population was around 24,000, saw a 995% 
increase by the time of the 2000 census, to almost 270,000. Raleigh-Durham in North 
Carolina registered a 1,000% increase over the same period, moving from 5,670 to 
93,868 over the same period. Suro and Singer identified 51 new areas covering 35 states; 
in 18 of them, the increase was greater than 300%. Among them are cities such as 
Nashville, Tennessee; Portland, Oregon; Washington DC; Indianapolis; Providence, 
Rhode Island; Orlando; and Las Vegas. The process has also affected distribution in the 
metropolitan areas. The suburbs, and in particular the new destinations, have also seen 
larger growth. In Chicago, for instance, 63% of the increase was in the suburbs, while in 
Miami it was 96%. On the other hand, one of the features of the new census is the 
predominance of males, which would point to the creation of new families when their 
families join them later (9). 
 
Work is one of the chief criteria dictating the move to the new areas. In 1986, some three 
million illegal immigrants were allowed to regularize their situation. They moved to areas 
where there was greater demand for labour. Having acquired work, they were then able to 
bring their families, a factor that would contribute to the increase in numbers the following 
decade. Politics also influenced matters. In 1994 in California, Proposal 187 excluded 
illegal immigrants from receiving welfare. A worsening anti-immigrant climate also 
prompted many to start a new life in more tolerant states (interviews in June 2002); while 
border checks prevented circular migration (Roberts et al., 1999). Without forgetting social 
factors such as cheaper housing in the suburbs, or the fact that once beachheads had 
been established, more immigrants would arrive. 
 
None of which meant of course that the traditional areas were experiencing a decline in 
numbers. In Santa Ana, for example, a city of 320,000 inhabitants in California, in the 
1980s the Hispanic and white population was equal at 44%. But by 2000 the white 
population had fallen to 11%, while the Hispanic was now 76%. In Los Angeles, where 
they made up 28% two decades ago, they now make up 46.5%. The Brookings Institution 
(2001) reported that non-Hispanic whites were the new minority in 100 of the biggest 
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cities in the country. From being 52% in 1990, they fell to 44% in 2000, less than the sum 
total of Afro-Americans (24%), Hispanics (23%), and Asians (7%). The term ‘minority’ 
begins to take on new meaning. 
 
In other words, we are talking of an increased population, undergoing sustained growth 
(see graph 1), concentrated and spread over a wide geographic area. All of this is very 
important as regards our subject. Given that volume, development and diffusion 
underscore the range and dimension of the phenomenon by guaranteeing the future and 
national reach. At the same time, the question of concentration has a series of effects –
inward and outward– that are directly related to the question at hand. One of which 
facilitates the conservation of the language and other cultural manifestations. At the same 
time, as more information becomes available that relates to a specific presence: 
businesses, associations, restaurants, meeting centres, etc, it becomes clear that a kind 
of territory is being formed, which takes on a symbolic connotation (10). 
 
Graph 1. Growth of the Hispanic population in the US (in millions) 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, Censuses for 1990 and 2000. 
 
Furthermore, beyond a certain point, they acquire sufficient critical mass to be able to 
influence the local economy, while generating their own services and supply networks, as 
well as influencing the political scene. This means that they will be taken notice of. This, 
and respect, are the demands that I have most frequently heard expressed by these 
groups. This is how Spanish becomes adopted by the service sector. From small, informal 
initiatives, Spanish becomes adopted by public services, ending up by institutionalizing 
the language. 
 
Hospitals, the fire services and the police spread the use of the languages of their staff. 
Doctors at the Presbyterian Hospital in New York in Washington Heights –an area with a 
high concentration of immigrants from the Dominican Republic– undergo Spanish-
language tuition throughout their stay at the institution. In Texas, police officers seeking 
promotion must attain proficiency in Spanish. 
 
In July 2002, in Phoenix, Arizona a Spanish-language programme was implemented for 
the fire service. Similar initiatives are underway in education. In Dallas, Texas, where 
more than half the school children (56%) are Hispanic, one in three of whom have limited 
English, a US$1 million programme was introduced in October 2002 to provide teaching 
staff with conversational-level Spanish. This added US$3,000 a year to their salaries. 
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At the national level, a number of other initiatives have been introduced (11). The Social 
Security, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Education Department, among others, 
include Spanish in their Web pages (12). The General Accounting Office, the investigating 
arm of Congress, offers a Spanish-language version of its latest report on workers’ rights, 
as does the Census Bureau. At the same time, a growing number of counties and 
municipalities (some 300 at present) now translate voting papers; a requirement of the 
Federal Voting Rights Act (13). Such initiatives are very recent, and although many of 
them are the result of federal law, they are also a response to demographic variables, a 
point that has been explored here. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting the political impact of growing numbers of Hispanics, particularly 
in electoral areas where their presence is sufficient to create new seats. Thus, they may 
well reach a point where they have their own representatives (14), or at the very least 
oblige the parties to seek their support. The use of Spanish is thus spreading among 
those aspiring for public office at the same time as awareness of the legitimate demands 
of the collective. As one of our informants, born in the Dominican Republic, and a 
candidate for a Manhattan District, noted: 
 
‘In New York City, every politician is learning Spanish. There is not a single politician, 
who, if they are serious about representing the entire city, doesn’t speak Spanish. And 
those that do not are learning, because they recognize that if they want to communicate 
and win the support of the Hispanic community, then they have to speak the language.’ 
(Interview, June 2002) 
 
And this is not just taking place in New York, or the other traditional enclaves. It is also 
underway in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa –states that have seen their Hispanic 
population double–. Senators, Congress members and others seeking public office are 
learning enough Spanish to ask for support, while placing advertisements on Spanish-
language television. On the campaign trail, they make an effort to at least utter a few 
sentences in Spanish (15). And we have already seen Bush pepper his speeches with his 
poor Spanish during the 2000 presidential elections. In May 2001, he gave his weekly 
broadcast entirely in Spanish. The White House Website –www.whitehouse.gov– has a 
Spanish-language option, an explicit recognition that this is now the nation’s second 
language. 
 
The expectations of growth in what is already the largest minority are having a major 
impact on American society. There is no sector that has not been affected in some way: 
the large corporations and other economic players; the political class; organizations and 
leaders emerging out of the collective –all are looking to make their mark–. And that is 
without mentioning the immigrants’ own governments, who are seeing their émigrés in a 
new light. And we should not forget the anti-immigration groups, who through powerful 
lobbies are pushing for changes in the law to restrict the rights of new arrivals, as well as 
pushing for greater Americanization against the threat of the ‘Balkanization’ of the country, 
as they see it (16). 
 
All have a part to play in this unfolding story. The fact is that despite the long tradition of 
immigration in the United States, the current situation is unprecedented. And not just 
because of the geographical, ethnic, social and cultural diversity of a group that for 
convenience’s sake has been dubbed Hispanic. Attitudes are changing towards the host 
society and despite the general high esteem that the recent arrivals feel towards their new 
home, their expectations are not the same as those of previous immigrants. History is not 
going to repeat itself. 
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But before moving on to the next part of the story, which in large part picks up on themes 
already discussed, we need to take a closer look at some key political and economic 
questions. 
 
The Economic Factor  
 
Numbers is not the only factor that accounts for the impact of Hispanics on US society. 
This group, in reality disparate, does however, present certain characteristics that allow it 
to be seen –and to see itself– as different, and which makes it particularly attractive to a 
market always in search of new clients. As Silvio Torres Saillant has pointed out: 
 
‘When more than 30 million people are able to see themselves as a single unit, with 
shared values, language, culture, and aspirations, their capital accumulates rapidly. 
Businesses will begin to direct their marketing strategies and publicity campaigns with 
greater precision. Some 17.3 million Hispanics read newspapers, watch the television or 
listen to the radio, and that is a goldmine that business is keen to exploit.’ (T. Saillant, 
2002: 447). 
 
That figure was based on the 1990 census. At present, 11% of inhabitants aged over five 
in the United States are Hispanic. In states such as Texas, New Mexico, and California, 
that figure is 25%. But Spanish is not just the country’s second language; it is the world’s 
second language, with more than 330 million speakers. 
 
And if we add to that the purchasing power of the Hispanic population, estimated at 
US$600 billion in 2002, as well as the US$220 billion earnings of Hispanic companies –
1.5 million according to some estimates–, it is easy to explain the interest that the 
community is producing (17). The value of the Latin music industry alone rose in 2001 to 
US$642.6 million. Investing in such a sector clearly offers tremendous money-making 
potential. 
 
At the same time it should be noted that Hispanic wages are lower than the national 
average, while unemployment is higher, as are poverty levels and the school drop-out 
rate. In 1999, 25% of Hispanics were living below the poverty line, making up 23% of the 
total population in this situation, 11 percentage points higher than the national average. 
The average unemployment rate was double that of the Anglo population (7% against 
3.4%). Among Dominicans, 36% were living in poverty, while their unemployment rate 
was 8.6%; 8.2% required public assistance to survive, as did 7.3% of Puerto Ricans 
(Logan 2001; Therrien et al., 2001). 
 
Nevertheless, the Hispanic market is a multi-million dollar industry that extends through 
Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Chicago and many other cities (Dávila 2001). The number 
of Hispanic-run companies grew by 30% between 1992 and 1997 (while American 
companies grew by only 7%), and their earnings by 49%, according to information from 
the Census Bureau (18). There were 1.2 million businesses at the time, giving 
employment to 1.3 million people, and with a total turnover of US$186 billion. Three 
quarters of them were to be found in four states: California, Texas, Florida and New York. 
Five of the first ten, according to the annual list of Spanish Business Magazine, are based 
in Florida, and belong to Cuban-Americans, the group with the highest standard of living 
and education (19). 
 
In Atlanta, one of the new destinations for Hispanics, a new shopping centre –Plaza del 
Sol– is to be opened, financed by Latin businesses and directed principally at the 
Hispanic community. The project, estimated at US$8 million, is the second such initiative. 
The first opened in 1999. Two years ago, a shopping centre known as Oriental Mall 
reopened its doors after a total renovation under the sign Plaza Fiesta. These are just a 
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few examples: their growth matches that of the Hispanic population. In 1990, the 
purchasing power of the Hispanic community in the state of Georgia was estimated at 
US$1.4 billion; today that figure is US$11.3 billion, and is expected to reach US$25.7 
billion in the coming five years. Such centres, as well as having a Spanish name, also 
attempt to recreate ‘the mood of the places they have come from (decoration, products, 
etc)’, and employ bilingual personnel (20). However, the majority of Hispanic firms (one 
million) are ‘micro-businesses’ focused on meeting the specific needs of immigrants: 
sending money and other goods home, legal services, import and export of goods from 
the country, etc. Some of these activities imply strong and sustained links to the place of 
origin and, as a number of sociologists have pointed out, constitute an alternative form of 
economic adaptation of minorities in advanced societies (Bash et al., 1994; Portes 1996; 
Portes et al., 2002; Landolt 2001; etc). The work of Portes, Guarnizo and Haller on 
economic trans-nationalism among a range of Hispanic collectives, shows that trans-
national business people make up a large number of the self-employed in immigrant 
communities. Many of these businesses maintain close links with the country of origin. 
 
At the same time, such work sheds light on the profile of those involved in these 
businesses. Contrary to expectations, they tend not to have arrived only recently, or 
occupy marginal positions (21). 
 
Banks and other financial institutions have recognized the economic potential of the 
Hispanic market, and are correspondingly changing their strategies. In recent months 
such institutions as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Fleet Boston Financial Corp., Citigroup, 
etc, have begun or ramped up programmes directed at the Hispanic population. For ten 
years, their services have been reduced to translating banking documents into Spanish, 
and instructions for ATMs. Now they are increasing their advertising budget focused on 
the minority market, launching Spanish campaigns, opening branches in Hispanic 
neighbourhoods and employing bilingual staff (22). 
 
The banks are also offering discounts to immigrants on transfers to Mexico, while others 
provide their customers with two cards: one for use in the United States and another for 
their family abroad. Wells Fargo allows transfers without the intervention of the banks, 
thus reducing costs. Some of these measures aimed at reducing the cost of transfers 
were recommended by the Inter-American Development Bank, and directly involved the 
Mexican government and the White House. But immigrants still face grave difficulties 
when it comes to getting a loan. Citigroup denies Hispanics credit three times as often as 
Anglos, according to a report by Home Mortgage Disclosure in 2000. 
 
But perhaps the most controversial measure (and significant) has been the acceptance by 
banks and other institutions of a matricula consular –a laminated identity card with a 
photo, name, address in the United States, and date and place of birth in Mexico– issued 
by the Mexican consulate as an identity card (23). Wells Fargo signed an agreement with 
the Mexican Consul General in San Francisco in November 2001 recognizing the card 
(24) at any of its 5,400 branches across 23 states. According to the Mexican government, 
it is now accepted by 61 banks and a range of financial groups at local level (Wells Fargo, 
Lone Star, The State Bank of Texas and the Bank of America). 
 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank, around 25% of Hispanics do not have a bank 
account. This means they must pay high service taxes to cash cheques or to send money 
to family in their countries of origin. In response Wells Fargo opened more than 35,000 
immigrant accounts over a six-month period representing some US$50 million in deposits 
in California alone. In answer to groups opposed to immigration, such as ProjectUSA, who 
accuse the banks of fomenting illegal immigration, their answer is that ‘it is not our 
responsibility to enquire as to the legal status of our customers’ (25). 
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But it is the media that has arguably undergone the greatest transformation –generating 
huge advertising revenues in the process– and which has best reflected the Hispanic 
presence in the United States. Univisión, the leading Spanish-language television station 
based in Los Angeles, is the country’s fifth largest, preceded by NBC, ABC, CBS and Fox. 
It reaches 90% of Hispanic households in the United States through a complex network 
that includes its own broadcasting stations, along with 33 associated channels, and 1,164 
affiliated cable companies. 
 
In June 2002, it increased its presence on the airwaves by acquiring Hispanic 
Broadcasting –the leading Spanish-language radio station in the country, with 55 
stations– at a cost of US$3.5 billion; it has agreements with Mexico’s Televisa and the 
Venezuelan Venevisión. It recently signed an agreement with AOL to offer its services via 
the Internet. The other major Spanish-language channel, Telemundo, was bought by NBC 
in October 2001 for close to US$3 billion. Its objective: ‘To offer advertisers the 
opportunity to increase their sales’, as the company’s head of news, Alejandro Brenes, 
pointed out in Hoy, on July 17, 2002. 
 
The printed media has also grown, with a greater number of publications directed at 
minorities. In New York, for example, a study by the Independent Press Association of 
New York noted that in 2001 there were 198 publications directed at minorities; a figure 
that now stands at more than 270. There are more than two dozen in Spanish alone. 
Miami-based Bendixen & Associates carried out a twelve language survey in which 43% 
of those questioned said they preferred to listen to the radio or watch the television in their 
own language (CNN, April 24, 2002). This process has contributed significantly to the 
spread of Spanish throughout society. 
 
In short, as regards the economic aspects of the question, several factors point to the 
likelihood of the Hispanic community holding onto its linguistic and cultural identity. Firstly, 
there is already a complex productive and commercial network directed at this segment of 
the population. A market built on the basis of differences in taste, values, and other 
idiosyncrasies cannot allow these to be diluted. The conclusion is that marketing and 
advertising will continue to highlight and maintain them (26). 
 
The Hispanic media’s existence is based on the presence of a vast Spanish-speaking 
community that still faces difficulties in using English –this is particularly the case with the 
press, with its specific interests– and so it will seek to foment and strengthen this 
situation, if only to reduce its initial weakness compared with the English-language media. 
Given the cost of advertising, its main source of income, its eventual clients will only opt 
for this medium if the audience share is big enough. At the same time, Spanish is 
increasingly a functional part of the labour market, given the demand for bilingual people 
in the Hispanic enclaves (27). Equally, the preservation of culture and the maintenance of 
links with the country of origin are for some the only way to achieve social status (Porte et 
al., 1999). 
 
Political Factors  
 
All sectors of the Hispanic community agree that the community has little presence on the 
political scene, in terms of elected representatives, as well as in the exercise of the right 
to vote –which although rising, is still low–. Regarding the first issue, the facts speak for 
themselves: of the 436 seats in Congress, 22 are held by Hispanics –barely 5%–. There 
are none in the Senate, according to a 2002 report by the National Association of Latins 
Elected to Office (NALEO).  
 
This is still an improvement on 1990, when there were only 11 Hispanic Congress 
members. At state level, an increased presence is clearly visible: 59 state senators (52 
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Democrats and seven Republicans), and 158 in assemblies (133 Democrats and 25 
Republicans). There is only one governor so far, Bill Richardson of New Mexico, and 
another vice-governor, Cruz Bustamente, re-elected in California and from the same 
party. In the Bush administration, 10% of posts are held by Hispanics –an improvement 
on Clinton’s 7%–. Among them are Rosario Marín, the first Hispanic to head the Treasury 
Department. NALEO says there are currently some 6,000 Hispanics holding public office 
in the United States.  
 
On the question of high abstention levels among the Hispanic community, a number of 
factors can be identified. The first is socio-demographic: age, income, and education are 
low; others are legal –many Hispanics lack the necessary paperwork, or are non-
naturalized (28% according to the 2000 census)–, then there is the lack of familiarity with 
the American political system and lack of interest in the candidates (DeSipio and de la 
Garza 2002). According to NALEO, in 122 of 435 Congressional districts (28%), the 
Hispanic population is higher than the national average (12.6%). And although the 7.6 
million Hispanic voters registered to vote –the majority of them residing in 14 states– does 
not reflect the demographic weight of the whole, they are three times the number counted 
in 1972 (2.5 million), and it is calculated that they could reach between six and ten million 
by 2010 (Jamieson et al., 2002; NCLR 2002). 
 
It is not just that time is on their side. A number of factors have contributed to higher levels 
of naturalization and voting: the 1986 amnesty that legalized the situation of some 2.7 
million immigrants; anti-immigration measures during the last decade; the gradual 
approval of dual citizenship in Latin American countries (28); the wave of patriotism 
produced after September 11; and specific campaigns with this goal in mind. 
 
The low participation levels in politics, and the fact that six states are home to two-thirds 
of the 270 votes necessary to reach the White House has converted the Hispanic 
community in an important group for the main political parties. This was seen in the 2000 
elections, and was corroborated by those of November 2002, which produced three more 
Hispanic members of Congress. George Bush and Al Gore have both made 
unprecedented efforts to woo this portion of the electorate, sponsoring commercials in 
Spanish and attending all kind of acts and events in the Hispanic community. They both 
made an effort to be the principal speaker at national conferences organized by bodies 
such as the Association of Latin Entrepreneurs, the League of United American Citizens 
(LULAC), NALEO, and La Raza, among others (Barreto et al. 2002). 
 
With the notable exception of the Cuban community, the political orientation of Hispanics 
living in the United States is overwhelmingly Democrat –as with most other ethnic 
minorities–. This has been the case over the last two decades. This is one of the group’s 
strengths in negotiating electoral policies: they are loyal, and make up a solid Democrat 
block vote in the states where they are concentrated (De Sipio and de la Garza, 2002). 
 
However, things are changing. Work by De Sipio and de la Garza shows that traditionally 
Democrat Hispanics are more likely to move towards the Republicans than traditional 
Republicans would toward the Democrats. This should be seen in the context of a recent 
study by the Pew Hispanic Center and the H. Kaiser Family Foundation (2002) that 
confirms loyalty to the Democrat Party –49% of voters say they are Democrats against 
20% who see themselves as Republicans–. At the same time, however, it reflects a 
growing political ambivalence, and the differences between the typical electorate of both 
parties. Thus, although Hispanics tend to be more conservative over some issues –almost 
half, for example are against abortion in principle–, at the same time 55% say they prefer 
to pay more taxes so as to have state services. And among those who plan to naturalize, 
more than 60% have no party loyalty, with only 22% identifying with the Democrats, 
against 14% with the Republicans. 
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The enormous differences within the Hispanic community, a lessening of support towards 
the Democrats among the newer arrivals, as well as the socio-economic advances made 
by some segments –which tends to be accompanied by a shift to the right– along with the 
influence that Hispanics now feel they have as a collective, has prompted the Republicans 
to look to widening their electoral base, while the Democrats are concerned that 
previously secure sands may now be shifting. 
 
All of which has produced bitter fighting between both parties to win the support of this 
electorate. Understandable, given the scarce margin by which Bush won in 2000 –he 
garnered 35% of the Hispanic vote and won in Florida by only 525 seats–. At the same 
time, the high number of young people of voting age that did not vote –15.6 million, three 
times that of the number of people who voted, according to a study by La Raza in 2002– 
needs to be taken into account, as well as the popularity of a president (29) who was 
determined to win over the Hispanic electorate, even if the more conservative wing of the 
Republican party was unhappy at this. 
 
In May 2002, the Republicans launched a weekly news programme in Spanish entitled 
Abriendo Caminos (Opening Paths), the cost of which is US$1 million, and is broadcast to 
six markets: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Las Vegas, Nevada; Fresno, California; Denver, 
Colorado; and Miami and Orlando, Florida. According to Raúl Damas, the director of a 
Republican survey company, this represented a step forward in the ‘constant efforts of the 
Republican Party to include the Hispanic community in its communications’ (30). With 
40% of the Hispanic vote, Bush would guarantee his re-election, something that the 
Democrats will do their best to prevent. 
 
Both parties have web pages and radio programmes in Spanish, and their presence has 
become routine at Hispanic civic events. They organize drives to register Hispanic voters, 
and their leaders attend conferences organized by the Hispanic community, while 
supporting candidates of Hispanic origin –the best way to attract votes–. 
 
Both project themselves as the logical choice of the Hispanic voters, the one highlighting 
its long-standing defence of the rights of minorities; the other because it is the repository 
of the traditions and family values attributed to Hispanics, while both criticise and 
undermine the efforts of the opposite camp. The Democrats tend to accuse the 
Republicans of marketing, while the Republicans attack the Democrats for taking the 
Hispanic vote for granted (31). Both direct themselves toward the community as a united 
and special group, and in some way removed from the general population and whose 
peculiarities require specific attention. Thus, implicitly or explicitly, they place the 
emphasis on ethnicity –which in practice becomes a celebration of the same–. 
 
The Republican approach is based on a message of inclusion, while attempting to 
distance itself from the position of such extremists as Congressman T. Tancredo of 
Colorado, who wants to end bilingual teaching, and impose a moratorium on immigration 
(32). They want to avoid a repeat of the experience under the governorship of Pete 
Wilson in California, who in 1994 tried to push through Proposal 187, a law that excluded 
immigrants without papers from access to public services. It was revoked in 1998 by a 
federal judge as unconstitutional, but it served to boost the number of naturalizations, and 
prompted many Hispanics to vote, losing the Republicans the state. 
 
The Democrats highlight their traditional interest in the concerns of minorities and 
immigrants. A. Gephardt, Democrat leader in the Lower House until the elections of 
November 2002, announced at the annual meeting of La Raza in Miami in July 2002 a 
draft bill, which, if approved, would lead to the legalization of between three to four million 
people without papers, of whom up to 70% were Hispanic. 
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This is one of the biggest concerns of the Hispanic community (33), and which Clinton 
attempted to address in 2000 –although the Republicans blocked his efforts–. Bush is 
now considering it, although limited to Mexicans. No progress has been made since 
September 11. Gephard’s announcement came shortly before elections for the legislative 
chamber that would see 34 senators elected (a third of the Senate), as well as 36 
governors and posts in state bodies (34). 
 
Both parties spent more then US$16 million during the November 2002 campaign on 
advertisements on Spanish-language television stations (Siegal, 2002), a record sum, and 
proof of the growing importance being accorded to this group. The use of Spanish is not 
justified solely by the clear preference shown in surveys (35). It also helps to overcome 
the linguistic discrimination that many Hispanics have suffered –and continue to suffer–. 
For decades Spanish was prohibited in schools, and is still in many businesses, 
institutions and government offices in those states where movements such as English 
Only (36) have a strong presence. At the same time bilingual education is almost 
unknown (37). 
 
That the president of the nation and others in public office should make an effort to speak 
Spanish, even if only through a few loosely strung-together words, sends a strong 
message. It is not only a sign of deference and ‘respect’ –as Jeb Bush or National 
Republican Committee member Rudy Fernández said during the last campaign(38)–, it 
shows people that is ‘normal’ to use their own language, and that the powers that be are 
interested in building bridges. This is in contrast to the perceived arrogance of the Anglo 
community by Hispanics. 
 
Hispanic organizations are, on the other hand, fully aware of the power of their vote, and 
are increasingly demanding that the political parties address the issues that most concern 
them. Raúl Yzaguirre, president of La Raza, made this clear when he presented the 
results of a study on voting tendencies among Hispanics. In general terms, they shared 
concerns with the rest of the population over education (39), the economy and crime, but 
with the addition of migratory policy, civil rights and foreign policy. 
 
Campaigns within the Hispanic community are now underway to increase awareness of 
politics, and the need to get involved, whether as voters or representatives. These range 
from campaigns to encourage people to naturalize, register to vote, training in leadership 
techniques, to the many working groups and conferences related to this area. It is worth 
pointing out in relation to this the huge network of associations that already exist and 
which reflect the interest in playing an active role in society, and of awareness of the need 
to be organized. A large number of them limit their activities to the United States, but a 
great many are also focused on events in their country of origin. Their aims include fund 
raising and subsidising public works (40) to political objectives (dual nationality, voting 
rights from abroad, electoral commitments, etc). 
 
The political arena now extends across both frontiers. Some US politicians on the 
campaign trail have begun visiting the countries of origin of the main Hispanic immigrant 
communities, in the same way that government officials and politicians from those 
countries now visit enclaves in the United States. George Bush’s first overseas visit after 
winning the presidential election was to Mexico; George Pataki, the governor of New 
York, and the mayor, Michael Bloomberg, both Republicans, have visited Puerto Rico and 
the Dominican Republic (41). 
 
Before taking office, Mexican president Vicente Fox travelled to New York to meet with 
Mexican groups that had supported him from abroad, and that had contributed to his 
campaign (interview, August 2002). Politicians from the Dominican Republic frequently 
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visit New York, while Mexican officials visit Texas, California, Arizona or Illinois. They are 
seeking mutual support –financial and electoral–, while increasing their area of influence. 
 
The positive effect of visits by Anglo-American politicians to the places of origin of 
immigrant minorities –often in the context of some kind of material contribution, and in the 
presence of local government officials– is clear. As regards the countries of origin 
themselves, the growing importance of émigrés –through remittances and contributions to 
local development projects– and their influence over the vote of their compatriots, as well 
as electoral support, increases their influence over the local political scene –while 
boosting their position as mediators and potential allies to the United States–. This has 
resulted in measures aimed at strengthening ties with the principal countries of origin of 
the immigrant community in the United States. 
 
Such measures include dual nationality, overseas voting, etc, all aimed at facilitating 
integration among émigrés. Mexico has perhaps taken this approach the furthest by 
setting up the National Council for Communities Abroad, in August 2002, and which has 
already launched a number of initiatives (42). In this context, the concession of dual 
nationality has been complemented by naturalization campaigns (Goldring, 1998; 
Guarnizo, 1998; Roberts et al., 1999; Smith, 2001; Jones-Correa). 
 
As we have noted in the previous section, involvement in politics in the country of origin is 
not limited to recently arrived immigrants, or those belonging to marginal groups. On the 
contrary, as the work of Guarnizo and Portes (2001) shows –and corroborated by my own 
research– these people tend to be well established in the United States, with a high level 
of education. Such involvement is not related to naturalization, nor is it opposed to 
participation in politics in the United States. Furthermore, as with other community 
associations and delegate institutions from the countries of origin, US affiliates of parties 
actively push for naturalization and political participation (interviews, NYC, summer 2002). 
 
But political participation means more than just voting. Non-citizens are still able to 
influence public life, whether at home or from abroad. If the basis for achieving its 
demands in the United States is the potential vote of a large, and growing population, then 
in the place of origin it is based on the economic impact of remittances –which in some 
countries is one of the principal sources of income and foreign exchange (43)– as well as 
material, strategic, and political contributions, and all in the name of patriotism and loyalty, 
to the place of origin, along with influence over electoral results (44). Hispanics are 
extraordinarily active in a range of areas, normally through community associations –the 
best indicator, according to L. Montoya (2002) of involvement in public life–. Such 
organizations are also efficient means of mediating between the grass roots and the 
parties (Maxwell 2002). We believe that it is important to highlight the two aspects of this, 
given that they strengthen ties with the place of origin, as well as heightening awareness 
of identity and difference. 
 
Cultural Factors (Language, Identity, Expression) 
 
Let us now turn our attention briefly to two expressive or symbolic aspects of culture: 
language and identity. 
 
The pressure traditionally applied by US society to immigrants to rapidly assimilate is well 
known. The image of Immigration and Nationalization Service officers changing the 
names of the recently arrived at Ellis Island has entered the annals of history. The new 
wave of migration –and the Hispanization of the United States– is considerably different to 
the past in many aspects, among them, the question of the host society’s attitude to 
diversity and acceptance of other cultures. 
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The struggle undertaken by the civil rights movement has played a key role in this 
process, and can be seen in the greater degree of tolerance towards diversity, and in 
legal terms in the special emphasis placed on the rights of minorities. Belief in 
assimilation, in the strongest sense of the word, has waned (Glazer, 1993; Alba and Nee, 
1998). Which does not mean that segregation and racial discrimination has disappeared, 
nor that there has been much progress in respecting foreign languages –indeed there 
seems more opposition than ever (Numberg, 1997; Crawford, 1999; Portes and Rumbaut, 
2002)–. Both remain obstacles that immigrants and their offspring must overcome along 
the path toward integration in a society that is opposed to them retaining their cultural 
heritage. 
 
The demands of cultural and linguistic assimilation are clearly reflected in the proposals of 
groups like US English, mentioned earlier, and the lack of interest, or outright opposition, 
to bilingual education. Little wonder that the older generation is concerned about the 
future of their children (45). This is one of the aspects that most surprised me in the 
course of carrying out this research: the dissociation between the affirmation of identity, 
and the clearly expressed desire that this continue through future generations; and the 
widespread lack of interest throughout the community towards conserving their language. 
 
It is not surprising therefore, that the general trend among the second generation, as 
suggested above, is a loss of fluency of the mother tongue, and its reduced importance 
compared to English. An inter-generational study by A. Portes and R. Rumbaut in Miami 
and San Diego, two of the most-densely populated immigrant cities, confirms this (46). 
 
While almost all young people in the study spoke English fluently –94% in the first phase, 
and 98% three years later– less than one third (29%) were able to communicate with ease 
in both languages by the time they had finished school. The same pattern emerged when 
it came to preferences. Some 72% of boys chose English in the first phase of secondary 
school, and the figure rose to 88% by the time they had finished school, despite another 
language being spoken in the home. 
 
In such conditions, what is surprising is that another language was able to survive at all. 
But Spanish did. This was the language that most young people knew (56%) as well as 
that most used in the home (34.6%) or with partners (43.8%). Other languages were far 
behind: the percentages for Tagalog and other Philippine languages were 12.6%, 2.2% 
and 4%. In third place came Vietnamese, with 6.5%, 5.8% and 5.1%. 
 
Spanish is thus the second language in order of preference, even though the margin is 
significant, and increases further between the first and second survey –from 14.8% to 
6.5%– indicating the pace of linguistic change. Among bilinguals, Spanish and English 
speakers made up to 47% of the total, depending on the nationality. Haitian and Chinese 
were 15% and 10% respectively. Hispanic origin is the principal factor in maintaining 
language: students from the community had a 51% greater chance of holding onto their 
mother tongue. And although 65% had lost fluency, this was nothing compared to the 
90% in the other groups that had completely lost knowledge of their mother tongue 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes 2002). 
 
There are a number of reasons that account for the results of the survey, other than it 
having taken place in areas with high concentrations of Hispanics: its proximity to English; 
the number of speakers at school and in the wider environment (Spanish is the lingua 
franca of Hispanics, while Asians speak a wide range of languages); and the presence of 
a large number of radio stations, television channels, newspapers, etc. The efforts of 
parents are thus supported by a range of external factors (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; 
Suárez-Orozco et al. 2002). 
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As regards affiliation and identity, the loyalty of first generation immigrants to their culture 
is well documented. This is reflected in the persistence of the idea of returning home, and 
of resistance to taking up nationality, participation in grass-roots community organizations, 
contributions to the country or origin, and holding onto national and religious holidays and 
other symbols. But life is more difficult for the younger generation who must choose 
between the options within their reach, and which makes the process of establishing their 
identity more difficult. 
 
According to Portes and Rumbaut, the most significant aspect of this process is the 
change in self-labelling that comes at the end of adolescence: positive in terms of their 
parents’ origin, but negative as regards their ‘American’ identity. Among Mexicans for 
example, 41% chose the former in the second phase of the survey (23.5% more than in 
the first phase), while only 1.2% chose ‘American’ (two points more than in the first). 
 
My observations while undertaking fieldwork corroborate this shift, and the moment in 
which it takes place. Different interviews linked the discovery of a national identity among 
young middle class students when they entered university. This was reflected directly in 
the use of symbols such as the national flag or tattoos, involvement in organizations 
linked to the nationality in question, and formal instruction in Spanish, among others. This 
is an indication of the growing awareness and importance they attach to the social reality 
around them, as the work of Portes and Rumbaut mentioned above points out. At the 
same time, a range of factors prevent full identification with US society, such as 
discrimination and segregation. This sometimes results in the adoption of the mother 
tongue and culture as symbols of pride against the external threat; a process that Portes 
and Rumbaut (1996, 2001) call reactive ethnicity. 
 
At the same time, the rigid racial structure of the United States is the very opposite of the 
miscegenation that characterizes Latin America’s societies. In this sense, immigration 
involves coming up against racism at some level, even if they have not experienced it in 
the country of origin. This is particularly the case for people from the Caribbean (47). 
 
To the restructuring of identity that goes with immigration, we should add what Dominican 
academics call ‘the third root’: the discovery upon arrival in the United States that they are 
seen as Black. At the same time, indigenous roots of other minorities places them in an 
ambiguous position on the racial scale, accentuating perceptions of difference. The high 
number of people who disregard the labels proposed in the 2000 Census in the question 
on ‘race’ –42% of non-Hispanics choose ‘other’, as opposed to 0.2% of Hispanics– is 
evidence of these factors (48). A study by the Washington Post, the Kaiser Foundation 
and a research team from Harvard showed that 59% of Hispanics rejected any 
association with Anglos, or Afro-Americans (49). 
 
All this takes place in the current context that sees multi-culturalism as a positive factor, 
while pushing for assimilation. An interview with a consular official in New York –who had 
previously been posted in Los Angeles– included many references to the rebirth of a 
sense of community and the rediscovery by Americans in general of the country’s 
Hispanic heritage (NY, May 2002). 
 
This, along with positive perceptions of migration, which sets the United States apart from 
Europe –as well as the positive factor that the migrant of today is also a citizen, and 
therefore a voter tomorrow– is reflected in the presence of the authorities and government 
representatives at festivals and other occasions often linked to the country of origin, and 
which are opportunities to reaffirm allegiance to one’s mother culture. Such events may 
be routine and with electoral aims in mind, but that does not rule out the positive 
contribution they make to overcoming hostility from elements within the host culture. 
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At the same time, there are two factors that distinguish the current generation of 
immigrants from their predecessors. The first relates to their symbolic position in respect 
of their own country and this. While the European immigrants came from states that were 
in the process of being formed (Germans and Italians), or represented dissident groups 
within this process (Irish and Hungarian) (Guarnizo, 1998), Hispanics had long been part 
of a history of colonization, national identity and the struggle against foreign domination. 
 
Nationalism and patriotism are key factors in the process of socialization, and are deeply 
rooted. At the same time, if for earlier waves of immigrants, the United States was above 
all a land to make their own, for Hispanics, it is simply the new face of the old empire. 
Hispanics have long been directly involved in the politics, economy, and even territorial 
disputes of their countries, and they are at the same time aware of the economic 
restructuring that is behind their Diaspora, and which is directly related to the unequal 
relationship between their countries and the neighbour to the north (Torres-Saillant, 
2002). All this highlights the obstacles in the way of full identification with the host society, 
and the tendency to reaffirm their own identity and origins. 
 
At the same time, migrants’ own countries play a role in this through the initiatives and 
programmes we have alluded to earlier. Mexico, for example, promotes the teaching of 
Spanish as well as other educational initiatives. The Dominican Republic also has an 
active presence through its cultural attaché. In 2002, the Culture Ministry there organized 
the First Consultative Forum in New York to discuss a decade-long culture plan, and that 
was supported widely within the community. This event coincided with the V Juegos 
Patrios, a sporting competition that included Puerto Rico, Canada and several US states 
(field work August 2002). Many other such initiatives exist. 
 
Finally, new technology and cheaper air travel will make a major contribution to 
strengthening ties with migrants’ countries of origin. Aside from the initiatives mentioned 
above –and many interviewees mentioned that their children had learned Spanish– the 
Internet has allowed an unprecedented degree of communication between émigrés and 
their birthplaces. There already exist more than two dozen web pages to connect people 
with friends and family in their hometowns, among them the following Mexican sites: 
www.juchipila.com, www.jalpazac.com, www.tulcingo.com, etc. The same applies to the 
Dominican Republic with sites such as www.mibellotamboril.com, www.misalcedo.com, 
etc. 
 
Above and beyond what we have already mentioned, international initiatives serve to 
widen migrants’ horizons still further, many of them of a sporting nature. One such 
example is the Mexican Sporting Federation of the North-eastern United States, which 
brings together 450 softball teams, and a total of 25,800 players, with a further 27,000 
affiliated teams (interviews, New York, June and July, 2002). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Visibility and arousing interest are very often the first steps toward creating the conditions 
that will later allow a group to demand its rights. If the peer group provides the conditions 
for making commonplace what in the new context is foreign –whether it be language, 
music or food– the attitude of the host society can either push these manifestations into 
hiding, or if they are seen to celebrate them, keep them in the open. And once this 
process has started, the moment eventually arrives when it is precisely these external 
agents who are most interested in promoting the idea of a ‘different group’ with its own 
cultural symbols, insisting at the same time in a (supposed) cultural unity, simultaneously 
emphasizing the (sometimes equally supposed) differences. 
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The processes mentioned above corroborate the growing importance of the Hispanic 
population in the United States: a population that has now reached the critical mass 
needed to attract the attention of other groups, and affirmed its position as a force in 
society. As regards the initial question, our work points to two possible answers. If the 
question is simply whether or not there is a future for Spanish in the United States, then 
the answer can only be a resounding yes: its presence is widespread, it has a well-
developed infrastructure to support it, and the interests surrounding it can only provide 
greater solidity. Continued migratory flows, the closeness of the places of their origin, new 
information technology, the interest of business and politics in cultivating this public –
without forgetting the United States’ doctrine of multiculturalism– all point to a promising 
future. And the same applies in relation to the host society’s identification with a different 
group: the average American is likely to find more in common with Hispanics than any 
other immigrant group. 
 
Another question entirely is what will happen at the individual level in terms of the reach 
and social range of Spanish, and whether its future is reduced to use within the peer 
group, or if it will extend into the cultural and political spheres –which will guarantee its 
use among future generations–. For the moment, based on our observations, the 
tendency, even among those who are perfectly fluent, is to switch to English when the 
conversation is taking place in an English-speaking environment. 
 
What is needed is a greater degree of consciousness regarding the need to cultivate it 
among young people, and the danger of its being lost. Furthermore, it is understood that 
its future be guaranteed amid the current bleak outlook. But it is also understood that this 
is the price to be paid for integration and moving up the social scale. On the other hand, 
there are the natural ties that we maintain to our language. ‘Like a fish in water,’ as one 
interviewee said (New York, August, 2002). Which is all well and good, but a stream is 
lost within an ocean. However, although it is now practically possible to live in the United 
States solely en español, the objective reality is that only those who can speak English 
will have access to wider opportunities. 
 
It is understandable that given the difficulties or the deficiencies of a (incorrectly named) 
bilingual education, parents put Spanish aside (both at school and at home). But leaving 
aside the emotional ties to the language, and the benefits of self-esteem and academic 
expectations, as well as greater cultural closeness between generations (Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2001; Porte and Hao, 2002), bilingualism is in itself of value in an ever-
increasingly globalized world, as we are constantly being reminded. 
 
All of which can only lead us to hope that as Spanish assumes a stronger role in society, 
and that the demand for bilingual personnel increases –a process already underway, as 
we have seen– that the language’s potential begins to be better appreciated. 
 
On the other hand, the loss or dwindling use of the mother tongue does not seem to be 
affecting the way in which people ascribe themselves. And while some may find this 
surprising seen from without, all the evidence points to a considerable degree of 
nationalism that is not based on language. The reasons behind this are many and varied, 
and this is not the place to discuss them. 
 
In sum, lo hispano and lo latino have, in my opinion, a solid future in the United States. 
Spanish will continue to consolidate its importance. However, unless it receives greater 
institutional support, it is unlikely that the gap between its development at the social level 
and reduced individual use will be overcome. At the present rate, we may well find a 
situation where non-Hispanics are making a greater effort to learn it than the Hispanic 
community itself. It is worth noting that the Republican Party, which for so long ignored the 
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Hispanic community, now offers Spanish classes to its members in Florida, and is thinking 
about extending that to the rest of the country. 
 
Princeton, November, 2002 
 
Notes: 
 
(1) This work was carried out during a stay in the Center for Migration and Development at the University of 
Princeton funded by a post-doctoral grant from the Secretary of State for Education and Universities of Spain 
and co-financed by the European Social Fund. An initial version was published by the Elcano Royal Intitute 
under the title Perdurará lo hispano en USA (Documento de Trabajo 2002-08, Madrid, X/2002). 
(2) Cited by Lawrence Auster in ‘Mass Immigration and its Effects on Our Culture’, p. 2. 
(3) This was made up of participant observation and in-depth interviews with immigrants and other 
informants, particularly from the Mexican and Dominican communities. 
(4) Promulgated in 1921 and 1924, and ratified by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, these 
established a quota system by national origin and favoured Western countries and severely limited 
immigration (Schmidley and US Census Bureau: Profile of the Foreign-Born Population. 2000, p. 8-9). 
(5) Ibid., p. 10-11. 
(6) See: J. Passel: ‘New Estimates of the Undocumented in the United States’. 
(7) Until 1970, Hispanics were not registered as a separate group. Mexicans have been since 1930. The 1940 
census recognizes those with ‘Spanish as mother tongue’. In 1950 and 1960, ‘People with Spanish surnames 
in five states; and in 1970, the question asked about origin and offered a list. In the 1980 and 1990 surveys, 
the list included Puerto Rican, Cuban, or Mexican, Mexican-American, Chicano, and ‘other Hispanics’; the 
second tabulated data on 30 additional groups. In the most recent, the question on ‘Hispanic Origin’ preceded 
‘race’, and allowed for more than one to be added. For the first time, the term Latino was used. These 
changes, aside from the increase in population, have added to the weight of the Hispanic population (B. 
Guzmán, ‘La población Hispana’, Census Information, 2000). 
(8) Some of the methodological changes introduced in the 2000 Census have sparked debate and appeared to 
underestimate figures from Central and South America, among them Salvadorans, Guatemalans, 
Dominicans, Colombians and Ecuadoreans. The Dominican-American National Round Table and the 
Institute for Dominican Studies at the University of New York led a national campaign calling for a revision 
of the data on this group. This was backed by the representatives in the Senate and Congress for the states of 
New York, New Jersey, Florida, Rhode Island and Connecticut. See www.danr.org/misreporting.htm and R. 
Suro 2002. 
(9) See: R. Suro and A. Singer: Latin Growth in Metropolitan America, VII/2002. 
(10) An example of this can be seen in Washington Heights and in Upper Manhattan, now known as 
Dominican Heights, or Quisqueya Heights by its residents, and where almost 80% of the population is from 
the Dominican Republic. Many of the schools are occupied in the majority by children from these groups, 
and their names have deep significance for the children: Juan Pablo Duarte, Gregorio Luperón, Hermanas 
Miraball, etc. At the same time, St. Nicholas Avenue in 1999 was changed to Boulevard Juan Pablo Duarte, 
the ‘father of all Dominicans’. The same process has taken place in other places with large Hispanic 
populations (field work and interviews). 
(11) Interviews: New York (March 2002) and Chicago (August 2002). On practices within the police, fire 
services and education departments, see M.L. Betsch, ‘More Cops, Fire-fighters Forced to Learn Spanish to 
Sep Jobs,’ CNSNews.com, 10/VII/2002; and J. Villa, ‘Fire-fighters going bilingual’, The Arizona Republic, 
July 10, 2002; and T.D. Hobbs, ‘Spanish holds currency for DISD teachers’, The Dallas Morning News, 
16/X/2002. 
(12) In 2000, the Clinton administration acted on the question of discrimination on linguistic grounds. The 
1964 law calls on federal government and organizations that receive subsidies to have some kind of system 
to supply services in other languages to guarantee access to those who do not speak English. Although the 
majority of the local governments are trying to implement this order, some agencies have already begun 
providing information in Spanish, as well as courses in the language for those dealing with the public. (G.C. 
Armas: ‘Language Barrier Affects Businesses’, and D. Kong: ‘30 States Have Multilingual Ballots’, The 
Washington Post, 25/IX/2002 and 6/IX/2002). 
(13) The law is applicable in counties and municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants that do not speak 
English as a first language, or if 5% of voters do not speak English. The law is applicable to Hispanics, 
Asians, Native Americans and native Alaskans. In Los Angeles Country, in the November 2002 elections, 
five other languages apart from English were valid: Spanish, Tagalog, Vietnamese, Chinese, Japanese and 
Korean. 
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(14) Dominicans resident in Upper Manhattan elected Guillermo Linares, their first representative in 1991. 
He was followed by Adriano Espaillat. Both were born in the Dominican Republic. When Linares stood 
down in 2001, there were six other Dominican-born candidates looking to replace him. Miguel Martínez won 
the post. 
(15) K. Díaz: ‘Como se dice, Please vote for me’, The Star Tribune (Minnesota), 25/X/2002. 
(16) See: Intervention of Lawrence Auster (2002) quoted at the beginning: ‘Multiculturalism’s Volatile Mix’, 
by G. Jonas, The National Post, 21/VI/2002, or S.A. Camarota, ‘Too Many’. 
(17) Hispanic Business, V/2002, p. 20 and 22 and 16. 
(18) Department of Commerce, Census Bureau. 2002, ‘Businesses run by Hispanics: 1997’. 
(19) Some 73% have attended high school and 23% have a university degree; among Mexicans the figures 
fall to 51% and 6.9% respectively (Therrien and Ramirez, 2001). 
(20) Y. Rodríguez, ‘Plaza del Sol: Latinos make a mark’, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 17/VII/2002. 
(21) See Portes et al. (2002): ‘Empresarios transnacionales: emergencia y determinantes...’ 
(22) The Bank of America, for example, has quadrupled its budget to U$40 million in campaigns with 
slogans such as ‘Creemos en ti’ (T. Padgett ‘Interest Grows at Banks to Taylor Products, Services for Latino 
Community’, Newsday, 23/VI/2002). 
(23) The campaign began with the symbolic transfer of US$200 by Rosario Marín, head of the US Treasury 
Department from a Citybank branch in a Hispanic neighbourhood in Washington. The initiative is part of the 
‘Sociedad para la Prosperidad entre EEUU y México’, signed by the two countries’ presidents. According to 
the IADB, émigrés sent more than US$9 billion to Mexico in 2001 (see FOMIN 2002). Calculations by the 
Bank of Mexico suggest that US$10 billion was sent the following year. 
(24) The Mexican government has fought hard to make this happen. The cards are now recognized in 88 
cities, 13 states and 798 police departments. The success of the programme has led Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Honduras to undertake similar initiatives. 
(25) Based on interviews. See articles by M. Liedtke, ‘Big Banks Focus on Hispanic Market’, The Kansas 
City Star, 25/V/2002, G. Gori, ‘A Card Allows U.S. Banks to Aid Mexican Immigrant’, The New York 
Times, 6/VII/2002, J. Johnson, ‘Mexican ID Card Gets Illegal Aliens Access to Banks’, Cybercast News 
Service, C. Dougherty, ‘US Banks, cities accept Mexican illegals’ ID’, The Washington Times, 18/VII/2002, 
etc. 
(26) As an advisor to the Mayor of New York pointed out: ‘You can reach Hispanics through English media, 
but you can’t reach English-speakers through Hispanic media’ (P. Furman: ‘New York’s Hispanic Media 
Look to Grain Greater Share of Advertising Money’, Daily News, 16/VII/2001). 
(27) My field work provided many cases of this. 
(28) Between 1991 and 1997, six countries, Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Nicaragua, Chile and Bolivia, joined the four that already recognized double identity: Uruguay, 
Panama, Peru and El Salvador. See Jones-Correa: ‘Under Two Flags’. 
(29) A survey by the Republican Latino Coalition in August 2002 shows that 68% approve of Bush. That 
figure rises to 78% of non-registered voters. The president’s biggest supporters were the recently arrived and 
those with English difficulties. Among those interviewed in Spanish, the approval rate was 74%, 12 points 
above the figure of those who chose English. The Latino Coalition: National Survey of Hispanic Adults 
2002. 
(30) Raúl Damas, ‘PanderCare’, The Washington Post, 30/V/2002. 
(31) J. Lawrence, ‘Both parties are hotly pursuing Hispanic voters GOP no longer concedes Latinos to 
Democrats’, USA Today, 1/VIII/2002. 
(32) See T. Tancredo, ‘Do We Still Need As Many H-1B Visas? NO’, Front Page Magazine.com, 
17/V/2001, or ‘Secure borders are citizens’ right, Decision 2002, 6th Congressional District’, The Denver 
Post, 6/X/2002. 
(33) The most recent study from the Pew Hispanic Center (October 2002) shows that 85% of those 
questioned are in favour of such measures. 
(34) See C. Hulse, ‘Gephardt is preparing a measure to legalize illegal immigrant’, The New York Times, 
23/VII/2002, and S. Dinan, ‘Gephardt pushes bill legalizing aliens’, The Washington Post, 11/X/2002. 
(35) An internal survey of the National Republican Committee shows that 75% of Hispanics believe that 
politicians should address them in Spain. They also believe that the preservation of their native language is 
one of the five most important issues in their lives (J. Howard, ‘Spanish language joins US culture’, The 
Washington Times, 20/V/2002. 
(36) According to ProEnglish –part of the movement– 26 states have approved laws making English their 
official language. US English, the biggest and oldest of these types of organizations carried out a national 
survey in February 2002 that showed that 84% of Americans believe that English should be the official 
language of the country (‘Idahoans say yes to official English’, The Washington Post, 21/V/2002, G.C. 
Armas, idem). See also G. Numberg, ‘Lingo jingo’. 
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(37) Millionaire Ronald Unz was the main promoter of Proposal 227 in California, known as ‘English for the 
children’. It was approved in June 1998 with 61% of votes in favour and 39% against, and opened the way 
for bilingual language teaching to be dismantled. In 200, and with his help, Arizona followed, as did in 
November 2002 Massachusetts. A similar bid failed in Colorado. 
(38) See T. Abbady, ‘Gov Jeb Bush Campaigns in Spanish’, The Washington Post, 31/X/2002, and K. Diaz, 
‘Como se dice, Please vote for me’, The Star Tribune (Minnesota), 25/X/2002. 
(39) In 1998, 30% of Hispanic children did not finish high school, compared with 7.7% of Anglos and white-
non Hispanics and 13.8% of Afro-Americans (Dept. of Education, 2000). On electoral attitudes among 
Hispanics, see NCLR, 2002, L. DeSipio and R. De la Garza, 2002, Barreto et al., 2002, and Pew Hispanic 
Center et al., 2002. 
(40) An example of this is the Hometown Associations. There were 500 such Mexican associations by 1998 
alone according to Luis Escla Rabadan, of the Colegio de la Frontera Norte (information provided by the 
author, Chicago, August 2002). 
(41) On February 19, 2002, G. Pataki became the first governor of New York to visit the Dominican 
Republic, an important source of votes. His visit coincided with that of Andrew Cuomo, a Democrat 
candidate who if he had won the primaries would have been his rival in the November 2002 elections 
(Richard Pérez Peña). ‘Pataki’s Santo Domingo Tour Passes Into Tropic of Politics’, New York Times, 
20/II/2002. On July 26, 2002, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg made his second visit to the island. 
He had visited it first on the occasion of the Flight 587 crash over Queens. 
(42) Aside from those mentioned, it is worth mentioning the 1990 ‘Programa para las Comunidades en el 
Exterior’ (www.sre.gob.mx/organigrama/pcme.htm) in the ‘Programa Paisano’ (www.paisano.gob.mx), the 
3x1 programme, e-mexico, ‘Ayuda a una micro-region’, etc. For its part, Colombia in 1996 established the 
‘programa para la promoción de la comunidades Colombianas en el extranjero’. The government of the 
Dominican Republic set up the ‘Mesa Nacional Dominico-Americana’ in 1997 aimed at coordinating and 
promoting a common agenda. Interviews, NY 2002. See also Guarnizo, 1998, Goldring, Landolt, 2001, and 
Smith, 2001. 
(43) The latest report from FOMIN by the IADB in 2002 shows that remittances to Latin America and the 
Caribbean were worth more than US$23,000 in 2001, and would likely reach US$300,000 by the end of the 
decade. The sums involved are greater than development aid in the case of Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, 
Jamaica and Ecuador, and are equivalent to 10% of GDP. 
(44) See E. Sepulveda, ‘Money boycott forces talks about voting’, The Reno Gazette-Journal, 10/VIII/2002, 
and J. Mena, ‘Mexico’s 2006 race comes to Santa Ana’, Los Angeles Times, 5/VII/2002. 
(45) A survey carried out in Los Angeles shortly before the ‘English for the Children’ vote in 1998 showed 
that 84% of Hispanic voters in California, and 80% of non-Hispanic whites (F. Murria, ‘Court upholds 
English-only instruction in California’, The Washington Post, 9/X/2002). It was also Hispanics, who, 
alongside R. Unz, campaigned in Massachusetts and Colorado to immerse children in learning English in 
2002 (see Rita Monteiro, editorial in ‘Teach our children English’, The Denver Post, 22/IX/2002). 
(46) The study Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study brings together data from more than 5,000 
students of 77 nationalities that attended private and public schools in both cities. See A. Portes and R. 
Rumbaut, Legacies. The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. 
(47) As was pointed out to us in an interview: ‘In the DR, people think of themselves as very white, very 
European, the blacks are the Haitians’ (interviews in New York, March and May, 2002). 
(48) Of the remainder, 47% said they were ‘white’, and 6% said they belonged to two or more races, while 
2% chose this option from the rest of the population. See Grieco y Cassidy, 2001, and Singer, 2002. 
(49) See A. Goldstein and R. Suro, ‘A Journey in Stages’, The Washington Post, 16/I/2000. 
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